These days, we are all data pack rats. Storage is cheap, so if there's a chance the data could possibly be useful, we keep it. We know that storage isn't completely reliable, so we keep backup copies as well.
the result would be 2.4×10 6 years. Suppose Sun watched 10 ST5800s and noticed that three of them lost data during the first year, four of them lost data after 2.4×10 6 years, and the remaining three lost data after 4.8×10 6 years; Sun would be correct that the MTTDL was 2.4×10 6 years. But we would not consider that a system with a 30 percent chance of data loss in the first year was adequate to keep a petabyte safe for a century. A single MTTDL number isn't a useful characterization of a solution.
Let's look at the slightly more scientific claim made at the recent launch of the SC5800 by the marketing de partment of Sirius Cybernetics: b "SC5800 has an MTTDL of (2.4±0.4)×10 6 years." Sirius implicitly assumes the failures are normally distributed and thus claims that about two-thirds of the failures would occur between 2.0×10 6 and 2.8×10 6 years after the start of the experiment. It didn't start watching a batch of SC5800s 2.8 mil lion years ago, so how would Sirius know?
Sirius says it will sell 2×10 4 SC5800s per year at $5×10 4 each (a $1 billion-a-year business), and it expects the product to be in the market for 10 years. The SC5800 has a service life of 10 years. So if
Sirius watched the entire production of SC5800s ($10 10 worth of stor age systems) over their entire service life, the experiment would end 20 years from now after accumulating about 2×10 6 systemyears of data. If its claim were correct, Sirius would have about a 17 percent chance of seeing a single data-loss event.
In other words, Sirius claims that the probability that no SC5800 will ever lose any data is more than 80 percent. Or, since each SC5800 stores 5×10 13 bytes, there is an 80 percent probability that 10 19 bytes of data will survive 10 years undamaged.
If one could believe Sirius' claim, the petabyte would look pretty safe for a century. But even if
Sirius were to base its claim on an actual experiment, it would not provide results for 20 years and even when it did, would not validate the number in question. In fact, claims such as those of Sun and
Sirius are not the result of exper imentation at all. No feasible experiment could validate them. They are projections based on models of how components of the system such as disks and software be have.
MODELS
The state of the art in this kind of modeling is exem plified by the Pergamum project at UC Santa
Cruz. 39 Its model includes disk failures at rates derived from measurements 35, 30 and sector failures at rates derived from disk vendor specifications. This system attempts to conserve power by spinning the disks down whenever possible; it makes an allowance for the effect of doing so on disk lifetime, but it isn't clear upon what this allowance is based. The Pergamum team reports that the simulations were dif ficult:
"This lack of data is due to the extremely high reliability of these configurations-the simulator modeled many failures, but so few caused data loss that the simulation ran very slowly. This behavior is precisely what we want from an archival storage system: it can gracefully handle many failure events without losing data. Even though we captured fewer data points for the triple inter-parity configura tion, we believe the reported MTTDL is a rea sonable approximation." 39 Although the Pergamum team's effort to obtain "a rea sonable approximation" to the MTTDL of its system is praiseworthy, there are a number of reasons to believe that it overestimates the reliability of the system in prac tice:
• The model draws its failures from exponential dis tributions. The team thus assumes that both disk and sec tor failures are uncorrelated, although all observa tions of actual failures 5, 42 report significant cor relations. Correlated failures greatly increase the probability of data loss. 6, 13 • Other than a small reduction in disk lifetime from each power-on event, the Pergamum team assumes that failure rates observed in always-on disk usage translate to the mostly-off environment.
A study 43 published af ter the Pergamum paper reports a quantitative accelerated life test of data retention in almost-always-off disks. It shows that some of the 3.5-inch disks anticipated by the Pergamum team have data life dramatically worse in this usage mode than 2.5-inch disks using the same head and platter technology.
• The team assumes that disk and sector failures are the only failures contributing to the system failures, al though a study 17 shows that other hardware com ponents contribute significantly.
• It assumes that its software is bug-free, de spite several studies of file and storage implementa tions 20, 14, 31 that uniformly report finding bugs capable of causing data loss in all systems studied.
• It also ignores all other threats to stored data 34 as possible causes of data loss. Among these are operator error, insider abuse, and external attack. Each of these has been the subject of anecdotal reports of actual data loss.
What can such models tell us? Their results depend on both of the following:
• The details of the simulation of the system being studied, which, one hopes, accurately reflect its be havior.
• The data used to drive the simulation, which, one hopes, accurately reflects the behavior of the system's components.
Under certain conditions, it is reasonable to use these models to compare different storage-system technolo gies. The most important condition is that the models of the two systems use the same data. A claim that model ing showed system A to be more reliable than system B when the data used to model system A had much lower failure rates for components such as disk drives would not be credible.
These models may well be the best tools available to evaluate different techniques for preventing data loss, but they aren't good enough to answer our question. We need to know the maximum rate at which data will be lost. The models assume things, such as uncorrelated errors and bug-free software, that all real-world studies show are false. The models exclude most of the threats to which stored data is subject. In those cases where similar claims, such as those for disk reliability, 35, 30 have been tested, they have been shown to be optimistic. The models thus provide an estimate of the minimum data loss rate to be expected.
METRICS
Even if we believed the models, the MTTDL number doesn't tell us how much data was lost in the average data-loss event. Is petabyte system A with an MTTDL of 10 6 years better than a similar-size system B with an MTTDL of 10 3 years? If the average data-loss event in system A loses the entire petabyte, where the average data-loss event in system B loses a kilobyte, it would be easy to argue that system B was 10 9 times better.
Mean time to data loss is not a useful metric for how well a system stores bits through time, because it relates to time but not to bits. Nor is the UBER (unrecoverable bit error rate) typically quoted by disk manufacturers; it is the probability that a bit will be read incorrectly regardless of how long it has been sitting on the disk. It relates to bits but not to time. Thus, we see that we lack even the metric we would need to answer our question.
Let us oversimplify the problem to get a clearer pic ture. Suppose we had eliminated all possible sources of correlated data loss, from operator error to excess heat. All that remained would be bit rot, a process that ran domly flips the bits the system stores with a constant small probability per unit time. In this model we can treat bits as radioactive atoms, so that the time after which there is a 50 percent probability that a bit will have flipped is the bit half-life.
The requirement of a 50 percent chance that a petabyte will survive for a century translates into a bit half-life of 8×10 17 years. The current estimate of the age of the universe is 1.4×10 10 years, so this is a bit half-life ap proximately 6×10 7 times the age of the universe.
This bit half-life requirement clearly shows how difficult the problem we have set ourselves is.
Suppose we want to know whether a system we are thinking of buy ing is good enough to meet the 50 percent chance of keeping a petabyte for a century. Even if we are sublimely confident that every source of data loss other than bit rot has been totally eliminated, we still have to run a benchmark of the system's bit half-life to confirm that it is longer than 6×10 7 times the age of the universe. And this benchmark has to be complete in a year or so; it can't take a century.
So we take 10 3 systems just like the one we want to buy, write a petabyte of data into each so we have an exabyte of data altogether, wait a year, read the exabyte back, and check it. If the system is just good enough, we might see five bit flips. Or, because bit rot is a random process, we might see more, or less. We would need either a lot more than an exabyte of data or a lot more than a year to be reasonably sure that the bit half-life was long enough for the job. But even an exabyte of data for a year costs 10 times as much as the system we want to buy.
What this thought experiment tells us is that we are now dealing with such large numbers of bits for such a long time that we are never going to know whether the systems we use are good enough:
• The known causes of data loss are too various and too highly correlated for models to produce credible projections.
• Even if we ignore all those causes, the experiments that would be needed to be reasonably sure random bit rot is not significant are too expensive, or take too long, or both.
MEASURING FAILURES
It wasn't until 2007 that researchers started publishing studies of the reliability that actual large-scale storage systems were delivering in practice. Enterprises such as Google 9 and institutions such as the Sloan Digital Sky Survey 37 and the Large Hadron Collider 8 were col lecting petabytes of data with long-term value that had to remain online to be useful. The annual cost of keeping a petabyte online was more than $1 million. 27 It is easy to see why questions of the economics and reliability of storage systems became the focus of re searchers' attention. 18 and one using data from NetApp, 5 greatly improved on earlier work us ing data from the Internet Archive. 6, 36 They studied silent data corruption-events in which the content of a file in storage changes with no explanation or recorded errors-in state-of-the-art storage systems.
The NetApp study looked at the incidence of silent storage corruption in individual disks in RAID arrays. The data was collected over 41 months from NetApp's filers in the field, covering more than 1.5×10 6 drives. The study found more than 4×10 5 silent corruption incidents. More than 3×10 4 of them were not detected until RAID restoration and could thus have caused data loss despite the replication and auditing provided by NetApp's row-diagonal parity RAID.
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The CERN study used a program that wrote large files into CERN's various data stores, which represent a broad range of state-of-the-art enterprise storage sys tems (mostly RAID arrays), and checked them over a pe riod of six months. A total of about 9.7×10 16 bytes was written and about 1.92×10 8 bytes were found to have suffered silent corruption, of which about two-thirds were persistent; rereading did not return good data. In other words, about 1.2×10 -9 of the data written to CERN's storage was permanently corrupted within six months. We can place an upper bound on the bit halflife in this sample of current storage systems by assuming that the data was written instantly at the start of the six months and checked instantly at the end; the result is 2×10 8 or about 10 -2 times the age of the universe. Thus, to reach the petabyte for a century requirement we would need to improve the performance of current enterprise storage systems by a factor of at least 10 9 .
TOLERATING FAILURES
Despite manufacturers' claims, current research shows that state-of-the-art storage systems fall so many orders of magnitude below our bit preservation require ments that we cannot expect even dramatic improve ments in technology to fill the gap. Maintaining a sin gle replica in a single storage system is not an adequate solution to the bit preservation problem.
Practical digital preservation systems must therefore:
• Maintain more than one copy by replicating their data on multiple, ideally different, storage systems.
• Audit (or scrub) the replicas to detect damage, and repair it by overwriting the known-bad copy with data from another.
The more replicas and the more frequently they are audited and repaired, the longer the bit halflife we can expect. This is, after all, the basis for the backups and checksums technique in common use. In fact, current storage systems already use such techniques inter nally-for example, in the form of RAID. 29 Despite this, the bit half-life they deliver is inadequate. Unfortu nately, adding the necessary inter-storage-system replica tion and scrubbing is expensive. 6 and on tape about $1.4×10 6 . Adding cost to a preservation effort to increase reliability in this way is a two-edged sword: doing so necessarily increases the risk that preservation will fail for economic reasons.
Further, without detailed understanding of the rates at which different mechanisms cause loss and damage, it still isn't possible to answer the question we started with and to know how many replicas would make us as safe as we need to be, and thus the cost of the necessary replica tion. At small scales the response to this uncertainty is to add more replicas, but as the scale increases this rapidly becomes unaffordable.
Replicating among identical systems is much less ef fective than replicating among diverse systems.
Identical systems are subject to common mode failures-for exam ple, those caused by a software bug in all the systems damaging the same data in each. On the other hand, purchasing and operating a number of identical systems will be consid erably cheaper than operating a set of diverse systems.
Each replica is vulnerable to loss and damage. Unless they are regularly audited they contribute little to increas ing bit half-life. The bandwidth and processing capac ity needed to scrub the data are both costly, and adding these costs increases the risk of failure. Custom hard ware 25 could compute the SHA-1 28 checksum of a petabyte of data in a month, but doing so requires impressive bandwidth-the equivalent of three Gigabit Eth ernet interfaces running at full speed the entire month. User access to data in long-term storage is typically in frequent; it is therefore rarely architected to provide such high-bandwidth read access. System cost increases rapidly with I/O bandwidth, and the additional accesses to the data (whether on disk or on tape) needed for scrub bing themselves potentially increase the risk of failure.
The point of writing software that reads and verifies the data-systems store in this way is to detect damage and exploit replication among systems to repair it, thereby in creasing bit half-life. How well can we do this? RAID is an example of a software technique of this type applied to disks. In practice, the CERN study 18 looking at real RAID systems from the outside showed a significant rate of silent data corruption, and the NetApp study 5 look ing at them from the inside showed a significant rate of silent disk errors that would lead to silent data corrup tion. A study 20 of the full range of current algorithms used to implement RAID found flaws leading to poten tial data loss in all of them. Both this study, and another from IBM, 16 propose improvements to the RAID algorithms, but neither claims that it can eliminate silent corruption, or even accurately predict its incidence:
"While we attempt to use as realistic prob ability numbers as possible, the goal is not to provide precise data-loss probabilities, but to illustrate the advantage of using a model checker, and discuss potential trade-offs be tween different protection schemes." 20 Thus, although intersystem replication and scrubbing are capable of decreasing the incidence of data loss, they cannot eliminate it completely. And the replication and scrubbing software itself will contain bugs that can cause data loss. It must be doubtful that we can implement these techniques well enough to increase the bit half-life of systems with an affordable number of replicas by 10 9 .
MAGIC MEDIA
Considering the difficulties facing disk-drive technol ogy, 12 the reliability storage systems achieve is astonishing, but it clearly isn't enough. News sites regularly feature sto ries reporting claims that some new storage medium has solved the problem of long-term data storage. Synthetic stone DVDs 23 claimed to last 1,000 years were a recent ex ample. These claims should be treated as skeptically as those of Sun and other storage system manufacturers. It may well be that the media in question are more reliable than their competitors, but as we have seen, raw media reliability is only a part of the story. Our petabyte would be a stack of 2×10 5 stone DVDs. A lot can happen to a stack that big in 100 years. Truly magic media that are utterly reliable would make the problems better, but they would not make them go away completely.
I remember magnetic bubble memory, so I have a feel ing of deja vu, but it is starting to look possible that flash memory, or possibly more exotic solid-state technologies such as memristors or phase-change memory, may sup plant disks. There is a lot to like about these technologies for longterm storage, but will they improve storage reli ability?
Again, we don't know the answer yet. Despite flash memory's ubiquity, it isn't even clear yet how to measure its UBER:
"UBER values can be much better than 10 −15 but UBER is a strong function of program/erase cycling and subsequent retention time, so UBER specifications must be coupled with maximum specifications for these quanti ties." 26 In other words, it depends how you use it, which doesn't appear to be the case for disk. Flash memory used for long-term data storage, which is written once and read infrequently, should in principle perform very well. And the system-level effects of switching from hard disk to flash can be impressive: Fast CPUs, fast RAM, and fast disks all use lots of power, so the low power draw of FAWN is not a surprise. But the high performance comes from another aspect of disk evolution. Table 1 shows how long it would take to read the whole of a state-of-the-art disk of various gen erations.
Disks have been getting bigger but they haven't been getting equivalently faster. This is to be expected; the data rate depends on the inverse of the diameter of a bit, but the capacity depends on the inverse of the area of a bit. FAWN nodes can read their entire contents very quickly, which is useful for scrubbing, as well as for answering queries. This is all encouraging, but once it became possible to study the behavior of disk storage at a large scale, it became clear that system-level reliability fell far short of the media specifications. This should make us cautious about predicting a revolution from flash or any other new storage technology. 1990  240  2000  720  2006  6450  2009  8000  2013 12800 In fact, what has been happening is that the capacity at constant cost has been doubling every two years, which isn't quite the same thing. As long as this exponential grows faster than you generate new data, adding copies through time is a feasible strategy.
Year Seconds
Alas, exponential curves can be deceiving. What is likely to happen-indeed, is already happening-is that the consumer market will transition rather quickly to 2.5-inch drives. This will eliminate the high-capacity $100 3.5-inch drive, since it will no longer be produced in con sumer quantities. Consumers will still buy $100 drives, but they will be 2.5 inches and have perhaps one-third the capacity. For a while the $/byte curve will at best flatten, and more likely go up. The problem this poses is that large-scale disk farms are currently built from consumer 3.5-inch drives. The existing players in the market have bet heavily on the exponential cost decrease continuing; if they're wrong, it will be disruptive.
THE BIGGER PICTURE
Our inability to compute how many backup copies we need to achieve a reliability target is something we're just going to have to live with. In practice, we aren't going to have enough backup copies, and stuff will get lost or damaged. This should not be a surprise, but somehow it is. The fact that bits can be copied correctly leads to an expectation that they always will be copied correctly, and then to an expectation that digital storage will be re liable. There is an odd cognitive dissonance between this and people's actual experience of digital storage, which is that loss and damage are routine occurrences. 22 The fact that storage isn't reliable enough to allow us to ignore the problem of failures is just one aspect of a much bigger problem looming over computing as it con tinues to scale up. Current long-running petascale high-performance computer applications require complex and expensive checkpoint and restart schemes, because the probability of a failure during execution is so high that restarting from scratch is infeasible. This approach will not scale to the forthcoming generation:
"...it is anticipated that exascale systems will experience various kinds of faults many times per day. It is also anticipated that the current approach for resilience, which relies on automatic or applicationlevel checkpoint-restart, will not work because the time for checkpointing and restarting will exceed the mean time to failure of a full system. ...
"Some projections estimate that, with the current technique, the time to checkpoint and restart may exceed the mean time to interrupt of top supercomputers before 2015. This not only means that a computation will do little progress; it also means that fault-handling pro tocols have to handle multiple errors-current solutions are often designed to handle single errors." 7 Just as with storage, the numbers of components and in terconnections are so large that the incidence of failures is significant, and the available bandwidths are relatively so low that recovering from the failures is time consuming enough that multiple failure situations have to be handled.
There is no practical, affordable way to mask the fail ures from the applications. Application programmers will need to pay much more attention to detecting and re covering from errors in their environment. To do so they will need both the APIs and the system environments im plementing them to become much more failure-aware.
API ENHANCEMENTS
Storage APIs are starting to move in this direction. Re cent interfaces to storage services 2 allow the applica tion's write call to provide not just a pointer to the data and a length, but also, optionally, the application's mes sage digest of the data. This allows the storage system to detect whether the data was damaged during its jour ney from the application to the device, or while it was sitting in the storage device, or being copied back to the application. Recent research has shown that the memory buffers 44 and data paths 17 between the application and the storage devices contribute substantially to errors.
Let's take the Amazon S3 (Simple Storage Service) REST API 2 as an exam ple to show that, while these developments are welcome, they are far from a panacea. The PUT request supports an optional (and recommended) Content-MD5 (Message-Digest algorithm 5) header con taining the application's digest of the data. The responses to most requests, including PUT, include an ETag (entity tag) header with the service's MD5 of the object. The application can remember the digest it computed before the PUT and, when the PUT returns, verify that the service's di gest matches.
Doing so is a wise precaution, but all it really tells the application is that the service knows what the appli cation thinks is the correct digest. The service knows this digest, not because it computed the digest of the correct data, but because the application provided it in the Content-MD5 header. A malign or malfunctioning service could respond correctly to PUT and HEAD re quests by remembering the application's digest, without ever storing the data or computing its digest.
The application could try to detect a malign or mal functioning service by using a GET to obtain the stored data, computing the digest (a) of the returned data, and comparing that with (b) either the digest in the response's ETag header or the digest it computed before the original PUT and remembered (which should be the same). It might seem that there are two cases: if the two message digests match, then the data is OK; d otherwise it isn't. There are actually four cases, as shown in table 2, depending on whether the digest (b) is unchanged or not. The four cases illustrate two problems:
• The bits forming the digest are no different from the bits forming the data; neither is magically incor ruptible. A malign or malfunctioning service could return bad data with a digest in the ETag header that matched the data but was not the digest originally computed. Applications need to know whether the digest has been changed. A system for doing so without incorruptible storage is described in Haber et al. 15 • Given the pricing structure for cloud storage ser vices such as Amazon S3, it is too expensive to extract the entire data at intervals to confirm that it is being stored correctly. Some method in which the service computes the digest of the data is needed, but simply asking the service to return the digest of a stored object is not an adequate check. 33 The service must be challenged to prove that its object is good. The simplest way to do this is to ask the service to compute the digest of a nonce (a random string of bits) and the object; because the service cannot predict the nonce, a correct response requires access to the data after the request is re ceived. Systems using this technique are described in Maniatis et al. 21 and Shah et al. 38 Early detection is a good thing: the shorter the time between detection and repair, the smaller the risk that a second error will compromise the repair. But detection is only part of the solution; the system also has to be able to repair the damaged data. It can do so only if it has repli cated the data elsewhere-and some deduplication layer has not optimized away this replication.
CONCLUSION
It would be nice to end on an upbeat note, describing some technological fix that would allow applications to ignore the possibility of failures in their environment, and specifically in long-term storage. Unfortunately, in the real world, failures are inevitable. As systems scale up, failures become more frequent. Even throwing money at the problem can only reduce the incidence of failures, not exclude them entirely. Applications in the future will need to be much more aware of, and careful in respond ing to, failures.
The high-performance computing community accu rately describes what needs to be done:
"We already mentioned the lack of coordi nation between software layers with regards to errors and fault management. Currently, when a software layer or component detects a fault it does not inform the other parts of the software running on the system in a consistent manner. As a consequence, propagate to other components that may be affected by the error or that control resources that may be responsi ble for the error." 7 In particular, as regards storage, APIs should copy Amazon's S3 by providing optional dataintegrity ca pabilities that allow applications to perform end-to-end checks. These APIs should be enhanced to allow the ap plication to provide an optional nonce that is prepended to the object data before the message digest reported to the application is computed. This would allow applica tions to exclude the possibility that the reported digest has been remembered rather than recomputed. Q d. Assuming the digest algorithm hasn't been broken, not a safe assumption for MD5. 19 
